

Catholic Social Thought: Rights, Natural Law, and Pluralism
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November 1, 2004

Introduction

In a recent article on “bioethics and the common good,” Lisa Sowle Cahill argues that “the real enemy of Catholic bioethics and social ethics is not internal Catholic dissent, religious pluralism among cultures or modern secularism as such. It is, rather, the stance of what might be called moral and political realism” (Realigning 13). Before I continue on with Cahill’s definition of moral and political realism, I would like to note the obvious, that realism is not usually understood to be pejorative, and certainly not for those who wish to make a difference in the world. For example, environmental activists and economists alike make policy proposals in terms of realistic, national self-interest (Jepson). Several decades ago, theorists such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau popularized political realism by disparaging a naive synthesis of the moral and political realms and by setting political judgments apart from the personal sphere where we can find moral clarity. It is precisely this blend of the moral and political, along with the theological and ecclesiological, which will be the focus of my paper.

I will propose that the Catholic tradition of natural law and its conception of human rights depend on the continuing life of institutions that stand apart from and sustain standards of justice independent from the nation-state and its corresponding economy (Murray, Religious 49-127). In Catholic social thought, these institutions are called intermediate or mediating social bodies—institutions that are not necessarily compulsory or legally established but more richly ‘public’ than bureaucratic

government— ‘societies’ such as family, neighborhood associations, civic organizations, nonprofit institutions, and trade unions, but primarily the Church, all of which function as “go-betweens” for the individual in relationship to the state and the dominant contractual (i.e., free market) economy (Pius XI 59-64).

Christians contribute to a defense of human rights precisely as members of their Churches, through their social and institutional presence across the globe. This assertion can be understood as a simple factual point, which it is, for instance, for Lutherans, Methodists, and Anglicans. It is also a distinctive emphasis of Roman Catholic ecclesiology. In traditional Catholic parlance, the Church is a society; it is a complete society in the sense that it has what it needs to fulfill its mission and ends, and one key feature of this society is that it is a complex (non-bureaucratic) institution (Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical* 53-95). The Church is necessarily institutional—material and social—insofar as it is established by the Spirit incarnate in the world (Hill 284-306).

My reference to the Church as a society has two functions. The first is to avoid narrowing a consideration of human rights and the Church to a set of beliefs about human rights or a conception of the human being as the image of God. This creed about human dignity is a piece with cult and culture. On a purely epistemological level, the point is that a conception of human goods, as human—that is as historical and situated—must be socially embodied (MacIntyre), and that, in the Church, embodiment takes the form of worship and the social practices which emerge when we join in our attempts to live in the world in a way that is faithful to the One we worship.

The second purpose of emphasizing the Church as a society, specifically as a worshipping body, is to highlight some principal features of Catholic social thought.

According to the modern Catholic tradition, the nation-state is not a society; yet, a society and its ongoing traditions are needed to sustain conceptions of a unified human end, basic human goods, and attendant claims about human rights. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a unified conception of human life being carried by a society other than a theological one—other than one that worships. This distinction between society and state is the ground work for John Courtney Murray’s landmark proposals in *We Hold These Truths*. Murray sums up the modern Catholic tradition when he holds that substantive agreement about the human good (in terms of natural law) requires a unified conception of our human end which emerges from and gives clarity to a social tradition (*We Hold* 45-78).¹

With this reference to a unified conception of human life, I have re-stated the title issue of this paper. Catholic social thought deals with matters of human rights from within a tradition of natural law that assumes a common human end—a common good. Given this presumption of a common good, what can Catholics say about human rights amid pluralism? In the first part of the paper, I will sketch a Catholic approach to the problem of human rights. In the second part, I will highlight the theological character of natural law, particularly in relationship to the positive law of the state, and finally I will propose that an ecclesiological tradition of the human good is precisely what Catholics have to offer in a context of pluralism. The Church has a task of sustaining institutions where its practical rationality about human goods counters the dominance of political realism— that is, to offer a practical alternative in a world where the self-interest of nations and “purely” economic interests win the day.

Rights

I now return to Cahill's provocative statement that moral and political realism is the enemy of Catholic social ethics. According to Cahill, "political realism is the view that world affairs are governed primarily by self-interest, that the interests of the powerful always result in the domination of the weak, and that nothing can be done to change this on any significant scale" (Realigning 13). Cahill's concerns, in the particular, are economic and government policies that systematically overlook basic health care needs of the poor, especially poverty stricken nations, and give little attention to the worldwide spread of curable diseases, not to mention AIDS. She notes that little attention is given to the fact that "in Africa, malaria is the number one killer of children under five. The leading causes of death for adults, besides AIDS, are respiratory infections, diarrhea, and malaria" (Realigning 12).

David Hollenbach, S.J., in his *The Common Good and Christian Ethics* notes that this kind of political realism is not reserved for policy makers and CEO's of pharmaceutical companies. He indicates that Americans, in general, tend to resist international involvement when it is guided by "strictly humanitarian purposes." In terms of Cahill's examples, there is little impetus to be actively concerned with a right to basic health care in sub-Saharan Africa. Hollenbach cites a 1999 survey of public opinion by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, which concludes that "Americans... are unlikely to favor international engagement to promote the well-being of people in other countries when this is not immediately linked with domestic well-being" (49). Hollenbach shows that a common morality of non-interference and tolerance quickly slides into a narrow utilitarianism which is measured by individual self-interest. In other

words, arguments for assistance to African countries would have to appeal primarily to our own interests (will the diseases spread to us?) and only as an auxiliary argument to basic rights or human need.

To be fair, we Americans are not so much selfish as cynical. We do not intend for the interests of the powerful to dominate the weak, but we see that all nations, whether England, Russia, China, or North Korea, act according to national standards of self-interest. States in the U.S., whether Maryland or Alabama, do the same on a national scale, as do counties and cities and people in government and in business. The realist rationality of power and self-interest has become formalized through decision making models like Game Theory, which are taught in colleges and universities throughout the country. Modern pluralism is a world of competing goods, which are asserted in terms of rational self-interests.

We should admit, as well, that our liberal political theory in line with Hobbes and Locke up to Rawls and Nozick gives us grounds to assert our rights as citizens by encouraging us to be suspicious of others, especially when they assert their rights over against us. Typical modern theories of political organization assume that the natural human being is a pre-social individual who enters society for reasons of self-interest and as a means to limit the interests of others. It is also built into modern theories to resist appeals to an authority outside this limiting social contract. Historically, this resistance meant, primarily, a rejection of the authority of the Church, and religious authority still bears the brunt of modern cynicism. Certainly appeals to individual conscience are allowed, but this internal authority carries no social force and supports the original agonistic theory of social organization. When all is said and done, rights must be

asserted by individuals (who, in the agonistic frame, have a natural right have them insofar as they are able to defend them), and the powerful tend to make louder and more effective assertions.

We tend to assume that human rights have a ground outside contractual social relations—outside the merely political—but it is often difficult to disentangle merely conventional grounds from something more stable. I cite as an example the memorandum, on the “application of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war to the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban,” by Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel to the President. I do not mean to assume that the Bush Administration intended to follow the logic of the memo, which seems to imply that torture is acceptable when it is not legally defined as torture. I suppose only that Gonzales’s legal advice was considered sound, demonstrated by the fact that he still holds his job.

In the memo, Gonzales advises the administration to avoid giving Afghani prisoners and detainees status under the Geneva Convention because such a classification, among other things, would bind the U.S., both domestically and internationally, to laws and standards of treatment that we might need to reject for, in Gonzales’s words, “it is difficult to predict the needs and circumstances that could arise in the course of the war on terrorism.” In making his arguments, Gonzales appears to assume that the Geneva Convention represents, not moral standards, but purely political and merely legal ones. International law on human rights, in Gonzales’s line of argument, is thought to be, not a matter of what is due to human beings as prisoners of war, but something equivalent to a tax code, where authority is only conventional. His

advice deals with a human rights code as a political convention: we ought not to be bound by international law because we might be liable in international courts.

If we find the Gonzales memo troublesome, we ought not to point our fingers at the White House. Most in the U.S. follow the same logic when the issue is raised about China's trade status, international labor laws, international environmental standards, and war ethics. It is not entirely correct to say that morality is bracketed out by a realistic assessment of our self-interests. It is more to the point to say that we find a world where moral goods are already crowded out, and realistically, why should we be the ones to take a disinterested point of view. The significance of the Gonzales memo is this. When push comes to shove, documents like the UN declaration on human rights are understood to be merely political and historical constructions. In a world of plural goods, politics is considered a realm where there is no moral authority outside of what is constructed by competing political self-interests (Hittinger).

When faced with this diminishment of the moral by the political, the customary remedy is provided by Immanuel Kant. Kant attempts to show that human dignity can be grounded in reason alone in terms of the rational will, and modern appeals to essential (rather than conventional) human rights are fundamentally Kantian. It is hard to dispute Robert Kraynak's claim that *all* modern Christian accounts of human dignity are more or less Kantian (even though one might want to reject Kraynak's own theology or politics). Kraynak argues that "pure" Kantianism (if there is such a thing) imagines the individual as "an autonomous being who lives solely by self-imposed laws, which means it denies the real existence of divine law or of natural law sanctioned by God, and it denies man's supernatural destiny" (159). Nonetheless, according to Kraynak, Kant remains eminently

attractive because he “separated rights from utilitarian calculation of self-interest and defended them in immaterial terms, appealing to an intangible realm of freedom that transcends psychological egoism and that sounds spiritual” (153).

Kant offers a way to think about human rights apart from history and politics, but in practice, we have little opportunity to be outside of historical and political life. In effect, Kantianism helps us re-produce a clearing of all authority outside the individual’s rational will (thus rejecting social convention and sheer politics), but it also makes social and political life even more vulnerable to utilitarian calculation and political realism. Once all authority rests *in* the individual will and when utilitarian calculation is the standard, then democracy is required as a procedural good, not as a means to achieve a common good, but as the best possible way to protect us from arbitrary authority and each other. When morality is reduced to a Kantian frame, we may find moral individuals and personally committed Kantians insofar as moral authority is vested in the individual’s rational will. But we will have only immoral societies because morality is considered internal, intangible and transcendent (Niebuhr). Kantianism provides an answer to political realism and, at the same time, clears the way for it to flourish.

Cahill’s response to the dominance of political realism offers an alternative. In reference to health care, she appeals to the “on the ground embodiment of the Catholic vision through a multitude of national, international, and transnational institutions,” such as community hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes which provide health care to the poor “even when it threatens their financial viability” as well as international institutions like “Catholic Charities, Caritas International, the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development... the Jesuit African AIDS network and the All-Africa Conference: Sister

to Sister,” plus “the international Catholic university system” and of course ecclesial structures linking local diocese with national bishops’ conferences and the Vatican.

Cahill concludes that “Catholics in Boston, San Antonio, Omaha or San Diego may feel too distant from people dying of malaria to make a difference... Catholic links among local and global realities provide vital institutional means to bring our ideals to reality” (Realigning 13).

In short, the problem of human rights within a Catholic frame is one of ecclesial-institutional embodiment. The Catholic hierarchy, for instance, takes a public stand in relation to controversial issues of our time. As I write in October 2004, Catholics have been debating how Catholics should vote. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops has issued a document stating the Catholic position, not only on moral, social, and economic issues, but also on what issues are important to Catholics. Cardinal Ratzinger of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has laid out guidelines for thinking through voting options. Some bishops have endorsed only anti-abortion candidates, and in response organizations have been developed by Catholics in support of specific candidates. Catholics for Kerry, for instance, argue (statistically) that Democratic social programs have done more to limit abortions than Republican attempts at anti-abortion legislation (Kelly; Roche). Whether or not this argument holds, it is interesting that there is a Catholic argument about the vote, and the argument itself is constrained in a certain way (on abortion for instance). Such use of religious institutions and authority disturbs individualist, Kantian and realist sensibilities. In relation to a defense of human rights, this agitation is precisely the point.

Natural Law

According to the long catalog of human rights violations listed by Human Rights Watch, almost all cases are perpetrated by a government's military, militia groups and warlords, or rebel armies amid civil wars (Human Rights Watch). The only obvious references to religion pertain to Islamic law, particularly in reference to the plight of women in Afghanistan and abuses perpetuated by Islamic courts in northern Nigeria. I mention this imbalance between secular and religious in order to raise the issue of the relationship between positive law (conventional laws of state) and theologically grounded natural law (Hittinger). It is a popular view that laws of the modern state are needed to discipline religion, but the Catholic tradition assumes the reverse, that positive law is rightly conceived when set within the frame of natural law, which has its source in the purposes of God as our Creator.

In the popular view, it is imagined that religious faith produces a violent struggle for political power, for example, that Jews and Muslims have been killing each other over religious differences for a thousand years and that the half century of strife in Israel is only the latest instance. The creation of the modern state of Israel by the external force of the UN and the dispersion of Palestinians from the land are not thought to be initiating events. It is assumed that Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland are fighting *because* they are members of different religious bodies, without reference to the history of Irish subjection under British rule. In this case, as in the egregious examples of Mussolini and Hitler, the problem is not the rule of faith, but the rule of state power to discipline religion and to use religion as a tool of the state.

I cite these facts knowing that the narrative in which they are understood is debatable. The story of the modern state is usually understood to be a story of freedom from religious strife (Stout). As an Enlightenment idea and as an eighteenth and nineteenth century movement, liberal state building is identified with freedom from arbitrary authority and with a defense of individual rights. It is assumed that “nationality” is a natural concept and that European nation-states wrestled nationalities, whole peoples, free from the old regime of Church and Empire, without knowledge of the fact that “nationalities” *per se* did not exist before nineteenth century nation building and its own form of imperialism and colonization (Cavanaugh, Fire).

However incongruous it may be, the contemporary state is embroiled in human rights violations, from civil wars in Africa to questions about the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. Islamic nations, for their part, are usually stuck in an untenable position of fitting a non-Western society within Westernized (often secular) forms of government. Nations like Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Jordan have a history of struggling with early modern forms of government (not traditional Islamic ones) within borders and under rulers often determined by European imperial powers.³

For good or for ill, the Western call for individual rights in Islamic cultures is part of an attempt to force these traditional societies to be put under the discipline of modern forms of secular rule. The modern (Kantian) framework of individual rights sees religious authority as arbitrary (as a religiously motivated *realpolitik*), and Western democracy is considered the best protection. In this frame, assertions about human dignity require a politics that dismantles (privatizes) an indigenous theological and social conception of authority. Western secular democracy must undermine the very social

traditions that would be needed to sustain human dignity over against mere assertions of power. In other words, secular democracy is asserted as a procedural good that must defeat traditional conceptions of a common good. For secular democracy to work political and religious authority must be seen as arbitrary; otherwise, individuals might vote against giving the individual voter final authority.

The point here is that a modern/Kantian account of rights re-produces the kind of political realism which undermines an appeal to rights outside political realism. I do not mean to say that Christianity in the West is not complicit in abuses of political power or that Medieval Christianity is to be preferred, but I do want to make the point that the political realism of the nation-state, not religious faith or the Church, is the main problem today. The Church, the Roman Catholic Church in particular, has come very late to using the concept of rights in order to defend human dignity (Taylor), and it seems to me honest to say that the concept of rights *as such*, that is, the predominant modern/Kantian vision of rights, still does not fit well with a theological understanding of the human being (Kraynak). However, that's a good thing. In the previous section, I dealt with political realism and Cahill's Catholic response in order to make this point plain. The cult and culture of the Catholic faith offer a way to ground human rights differently and to make sense of a social tradition that understands conventional standards of justice in terms of God's purposes for human life.²

A now classic appeal to natural law in support of human rights is John XXIII's *Pacem in terris*. In an introduction to the document, David O'Brien and Thomas Shannon explain that the rights defended in the encyclical "are not in themselves unique or constitutive of a major departure from traditional Catholic social thought." What is

distinctive, they say, is that rights understood in the wide breadth of the tradition are grouped and listed “in such an explicit manner.” O’Brien and Shannon also note that the Pope gives a comprehensive— a maximal—account of rights. Along with a common conception of rights, “such as respect for one’s person and religious freedom, John also argues for some not accepted as easily: the right to freedom in searching for truth and in expressing one’s opinions, the right to choose freely one’s state of life, the right to work” and so on. This “[comprehensive] listing sets out a social agenda and provides criteria for evaluation of social practices” (O’Brien and Shannon 129).

John XXIII’s account brings together traditional Catholic social thought by uniting a variegated list of rights through a teleological understanding of human dignity and nature. The Pope sets out a general framework of natural law and makes a broad appeal to the human being as a person, “that is, his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will” (no. 9). However, this common (Kantian) definition is set within a wider theological frame. The dignity and rights of the human being are grounded in eternal law, in God as “the first truth and highest good” (no. 38). In traditional terms, human intelligence and freedom are understood to be fulfilled in communion with God and, because directed to God, fulfilled in love of neighbor as well.

John XXIII’s explication of rights is directed to what fulfills the human being, which is found in the law that is in us by our nature, not our nature as instinctual or determined but as intelligent and free. Law is the reasonable measure of human acts according to the good that is common to all (Aquinas I-II 90.2). Natural law is our free participation in the eternal law, through which we have “a natural inclination to [our]

proper act and end” (Aquinas I-II 91.2). And eternal law is the rule and measure of all; it points to God as the source and fulfillment of all (Gilson 266).

From this framework, John XXIII sets human rights in relation to human, positive law by citing Aquinas’ third article on eternal law (Aquinas I-II 93.3). “Human law... is derived from the eternal law. In so far as it falls short of right reason, a law is said to be a wicked law; and so, lacking the true nature of law, it is rather a kind of violence” (Aquinas I-II 93.3.ob2 cited in John no. 51). In other words, “right reason” provides the criteria to judge social practices as well as national and international law insofar as it is grounded theologically. The question of how right reason or natural law is situated theologically is an important one. It is a mistake to conceive of eternal law as a theological version of Kantian ethics, that is, as a construct of “religious” reason *in itself* apart from historical and social development. It is a mistake to conceive of natural law as a similar construct of free-floating (pure) practical reason (Porter 44). Natural law emerges out of a long tradition of Christian theological inquiry and social practices, particularly in terms of the Church’s engagement with non-Christian intellectual sources and practical wisdom.

This last point about intellectual and practical engagement is critical. The Church’s tradition of natural law is a history of encountering, sometimes accepting and sometimes countering, the world’s wisdom in terms of its reading of Scripture, its worship, and its proclamation of salvation in Jesus Christ. The task of reading Scripture in itself is not as straightforward as moderns would like it to be. For instance, the unity of the canon forced patristic and medieval theologians to give an account of what we moderns would call cultural and historical differences, but they could not accept an easy

answer based on cultural or historically relativism. They had to explain theologically, for instance, why the Patriarchs had many wives and how Abraham could agree to sacrifice Isaac, but had to do so with a unified conception of God's law. For centuries, Scripture was set along side Greek philosophy as well (Porter 32-7). A key to understanding the pagan philosophers was the Trinitarian principle that our Creator is our Redeemer; there is only one Wisdom, and the Christian's task is to engage the world's learning and transform it. Pope John XXIII uses this principle when giving a natural law account of human rights. After he introduces his natural law account, Pope John immediately appeals to God's plan of salvation: "If we look upon the dignity of the human person in light of divinely revealed truth, we cannot help but esteem it far more highly; for men are redeemed by the blood of Jesus Christ, they are by grace the children and friends of God and heirs of eternal glory" (no. 10).

Through a historical analysis of the early scholastic period, Jean Porter shows that natural law is neither a "purely rationalistic" morality nor an inflexibly narrow account of Christian revelation (46). The tradition of natural law develops in terms of a wide range of texts and social movements, in terms of Platonic thought and Aristotle's magnanimous man, on one hand, and on the other, the commitment to poverty and communal living of Francis of Assisi. Porter indicates that a pre-Christian tradition of natural law was adopted "by early Christian thinkers for specifically theological reasons [namely the incarnation], and transformed by this aspiration into a distinctively Christian doctrine" (46).

[According to Porter,] the subsequent history of this tradition complicates the picture still further, because in the later modern period, it does begin to be

understood and promoted as a purely rationalistic morality. Still later, it begins to be understood as a rationalistic tradition that happens to be, as it were, in the guardianship of a religious tradition – and that leads to a further complexity, that the natural law tradition is pressed into service as a point of entry into public discourse for religious, specifically Catholic, voices. (46)

This final stage, of which John XXIII is an heir, is inaugurated by Leo XIII at the end of the nineteenth century.

In the twentieth century, a Catholic theory of the secular state and society develops which puts the legitimacy of political authority and social practices in terms of natural law morality—in the multiplicity of rights and duties required to bring human beings to fulfillment in a theological, although not explicitly Christological, account of the common good. The developing Catholic account of human rights emerges out of this tradition, a tradition of thought which is part of the Church’s ongoing life of worship and prayer, practices of discipleship, theological inquiry, maintaining educational and health care institutions, feeding the hungry, and figuring out how to properly engage the world. Natural law and ideas of human rights are unified with these practices of the Church through a conception of and journey to our common end in God and our venture to live into how God’s purposes for the world have been revealed in Jesus Christ.

Pluralism

A Catholic account of human rights is plural-form; it is a rich account of the social fulfillment for which we are created by God. But it is not pluralistic. The tradition’s account of rights is ends directed, not procedural. As an aside, this means that

democratic and constitutional forms of government are good, not because they undermine external authority, but primarily because they make possible active, personal investment in the common good. This conception of rights and duties can be seen in Cahill's rejection of political realism and in Hollenbach's appeal to the common good.

Hollenbach, in effect, argues against a two-sided conception of rights as the defensive right of non-interference by others and the right to assert one's interests (as long as they do unduly interfere with the rights of others). He and Cahill think of rights in terms of engagement and participation, in terms of giving others their due—their share in a maximalist account of human fulfillment and our common good.

This Catholic conception of rights and the common good puts Christians in the West in a difficult position. We have to be suspicious of Western cultural dominance, but we cannot, theologically speaking, give up on a common human end. We will promote democracy, but not as a polity for bracketing out substantive questions and disagreements about moral authority and the common good. Cahill, in her "Toward Global Ethics," attempts to strike a balance between asserting a universal human ethics and awareness that human morality, as human, is culturally and historically conditioned. She is particularly wary of contemporary forms of imperialism, where conceptions of the global "community" are driven by national security interests, Western control over non-Western areas of the world, and the dominance of free market capitalism and profit-making corporations (rather than human need) in determining international economic "interests." Cahill's approach to this problem is to sustain an account of common human goods both theoretically and practically. We are ending where this paper began. Cahill calls us to sustain mediating societies—practical infrastructures, networks, and

institutions as an alternative to political realism and the dominant economy of self-interest—to provide for the rights of persons and to sustain a social tradition that can make good sense of rights and call nation-states, international corporations, and political movements accountable.

How can Catholics contribute to a defense of human rights? The theoretical answer is to continue to engage modern forms of thought in terms of our faith in the redemption of creation, and to set our epistemological and theoretical questions within the context of practical ones. The practical answer is: for the Church to be what it is given to be by the Spirit, a social body—the body of Christ—through which we attain a vision of our common good in God; for the common vision to open a way for participation in a multiplicity of institutions (both religious and secular) that sustain the multitude of goods that bring human life to its fulfillment; to be and sustain institutions of an alternative politics and economics of common good, and to offer this alternative as a social witness.

Notes

¹ This claim about Murray would have to be argued in detail, if space permitted. He holds that the Catholic natural law tradition does not require suppositions based on Christian revelation; however, he does recognize, as a matter of historical fact and theological understanding, that the Catholic tradition (both practical and intellectual) is distinctive insofar as it embodies natural law thinking and commitments. The Catholic tradition carries/embodies an understanding of human life ordered by God. Charles E. Curran, in *American Catholic Social Ethics*, argues that Murray's understanding of social/civic unity is too dependent on metaphysical, ontological, and epistemology unity (225-6). The argument with Curran is whether or not disunity in a basic understanding of the human being can produce substantive unity. In this matter, it seems to me that the burden of proof is on Curran rather than Murray. Murray recognizes that the anthropology of modern politics and political theory cannot sustain social life.

² The purposes of this paper limit my ability to engage arguments within Catholic theology about natural law, with those who want to detach natural law from its theological sources. For the outline of such an argument see David M. McCarthy, "Shifting Settings From Subculture to Pluralism: Catholic Moral Theology in an Evangelical Key," *Communio* 31.1 (Spring 2004): 85-110.

³ For instance, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and much of Iraq were carved out of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and governed by France or Britain. In Jordan, for example, King Abdullah was set up as monarch by the British; his brother Faisal was made the monarch of Iraq. More recently in Iran, the intervention of U.S. and British intelligence agencies were instrumental in undermining Iran's parliamentary system. In 1965, Mohammad Mossadeq was overthrown, and the US and British backed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi instituted and solidified his autocratic rule.

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